

State and Social Revolution in South Africa: Reflections on the Comparative Perspectives of Greenberg and Skocpol

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Michael Burawoy

Many stubbornly insist on reducing Marxist analysis of racism to Marx's formulations on colonialism and the Irish question or Baran and Sweezy's representation of racism as a means of dividing the working class. Although the understanding of racism remains a vulnerable dimension of Marxism, there have been significant developments in the last decade and few more noteworthy than in the analysis of South Africa. In this connection Stanley Greenberg's *Race and State in Capitalist Development* is a landmark book. It unravels the changing class forces behind racial orders in South Africa, Alabama, Northern Ireland and Israel. Although Greenberg distances himself from Marxist scholarship, treating it as a hypothesis to be investigated rather than a framework to be developed, by the end of the book there is clearly no turning back from Marxism. The problems to which he is led and which are posed in his conclusion are precisely the ones that have dominated recent Marxist analysis of South Africa: a rich literature which he never seriously confronts.

South African communists and socialists have had to deal with the tenacity of white working class racism for over sixty years. Indeed, they have often perpetrated such racism themselves. Since its formation in 1921 the South African Communist Party has been the arena of vigorous debate over the role of race in the development of South Africa. Its history is the history of bitter disputes over political strategy. How should communists relate to the bitter and often violent struggles of militant white workers against capitalists seeking to displace them with cheap Black labor? What role should communists

have played when white miners rose against mine owners in the Rand revolt of 1922 under the banner of "white workers of the world unite for a white South Africa?" To be sure some tried to win over white workers to a non-racial perspective on class solidarity. After the failure of such attempts to reverse the deep felt racism of white workers, rooted in real material interests, communists turned to Black workers as a potential revolutionary force. Drawing on Lenin's theses on colonialism they argued for a two stage theory of revolution—the socialist revolution must be preceded by a nationalist revolution. The immediate tasks, therefore, were to organize Black workers and peasants. In practice the twists and turns of the policies and purges of the South African Communist Party were as sensitive to struggles within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern as they were to the local conditions.

State repression, racism and arbitrary commands from Moscow made organizing drives among Africans, Coloured and Asians difficult. Precisely because these adverse conditions and because racism so deeply impregnated every facet of life, those communists—both Black and white—who managed to sustain a commitment to revolutionary struggle and to a non-racial South Africa became powerful figures. A number of notable studies have emerged from the communist movement. Eddie Roux's *Time Longer than Rope* was the first Marxist attempt to rewrite South Africa's history from the point of view of the subjugated populations. Roux traces the varieties of African resistance movements from the earliest confrontations with Afrikaner colonists to the underground struggles of ANC and PAC in the early sixties. In *Class and Colour in South Africa: 1850–1950*, prominent communists Jack and Ray Simons offer a more detailed and analytical account of the interplay of race and class in the struggles shaped by South Africa's economic development. Throughout they emphasize the critical role of the white working class in defending its racial privileges and the illusions harbored by Africans concerning a peaceful road to racial equality. Only in the recent period did the rise of a police state turn Africans to more violent tactics. And it is in this most recent period, according to the Simons' book, that the growing coincidence of race and class collapses the two stage revolution into a single national-socialist revolution.

Published in 1968, Simons and Simons have been a major inspiration behind the burgeoning Marxist literature in the 1970s. Working in a similar tradition as Roux and the Simons, but emphasizing the day to day experience of resistance and subordination, are Charles van Onselen's wonderful social histories of urban Africans. Here we see the powerful influence of the social history of E. P. Thompson, the attempt to recall the experience of the oppressed as an inspiration to the

struggles of today. But perhaps the most distinctive body of work to have emerged in the 1970s came from white South Africans exiled in Britain. Much more attuned to theoretical issues in the Marxist analysis of race and class and seeking to escape the uniqueness of South Africa are Wolpe (1972), Legassick (1974), Johnstone (1970), Trapido (1971), Morris (1976), O'Meara (1975), Kaplan (1976), Davies (1979), and others who began to develop an explicit alternative to conventional liberal historiography of South Africa. (See Burawoy [1981a] for a review of this literature.) They opposed the thesis that racism in South Africa was an "irrational" factor, conjured up by the prejudices of white workers, which would give way to the forces of rationality impelled by the conditions of rapid industrialization. That is, they opposed the modernization thesis that particularistic restrictions on the mobility of factors of production were incompatible with economic growth. Rather they tried to demonstrate that capitalists had not merely adapted to racism but had actively mobilized the racial order for their own ends. They began to explore the specific social relations of exploitation and domination that lay concealed beneath the different expressions of racism.

Thus Frederick Johnstone (1976) distinguishes between job color bars and exploitation color bars. The former referred to discrimination which shaped patterns of mobility and structures of opportunity whereas the latter referred to discriminatory institutions which enhanced levels of exploitation through guaranteeing cheap labor. In an article which instigated considerable debate and set Marxism on new paths Harold Wolpe (1972) argued that racism was an expression of specific articulation of capitalist and precapitalist modes of production. That is, the institutions of racism were mechanisms for maintaining subsistence economies in the reserves where the Black labor force was renewed while single male workers were maintained on very low wages in the towns. The transition from the period of "segregation" to the period of "apartheid" was the reflection in the political arena of the erosion of the reserves as a mechanism for subsidizing cheap labor for capital. Overcrowding and soil erosion undermined the subsistence base and new mechanisms had to be found for guaranteeing cheap labor power. Thus, in the period of apartheid, political repression becomes the new mode of maintaining low wages. But, as Mariotti (1979) has recently argued, this shift to the political level does not tell us of the new material basis of cheap labor power. She tries to show that the role of women in providing the means of existence in the reserves begins to be transferred to the towns where they become a part of multiple earner families. So for Mariotti the changing forms of racism are in part expressed through changing modes of female exploitation.

These "functionalist" accounts in which racism is viewed as serving the interests of capitalism if not each individual capitalist prompted a second literature which attempts to examine the mechanisms through which racism comes to play this role. Thus O'Meara's (1975) important study of the 1946 African mine workers' strike sought to uncover the interests of different classes and class fractions in the various institutions of the racial order which guaranteed cheap Black labor through the system of migrant labor. His was the first of a series of attempts to understand the "power blocs" that have constituted South Africa's dominant classes. Typically twentieth century South Africa is divided into periods, each characterized by a particular "hegemonic" fraction directing the dominant classes and, by implication, shaping the policies of the state (Davies et al. 1976). Shifts in state intervention are therefore understood in terms of a realignment of power within the dominant classes: mining capital eventually relinquished its dominant role to manufacturing capital which is in turn supplanted by multinational monopoly capital. But none of these analyses, which draw their inspiration from Poulantzas's early work, examine the state itself. Rather, the state becomes an instrument of the "hegemonic" fraction and when this does not fit the historical reality the state is conveniently endowed with "relative autonomy."

In his most recent work Wolpe (1980) calls for a sustained analysis of the actual workings of the state as a set of relations and as an arena of struggle. The state is neither an "object" wielded by a class or a class-fraction nor a subject with a metaphysical will of its own that impresses itself on the totality. Instead it is a set of apparatuses within which and between which there is continual struggle. While such a perspective allows one to grasp political developments that fall short of the violent overthrow of capitalism through nationalist struggle, at the same time we lose sight of the unity of the state and how it is that the state tends to "preserve the cohesion of the entire social formation." Curiously, in his book *Race and State in Capitalist Development*, Greenberg follows a very simple trajectory: from the examination of the class bases of racism he turns to questions about the workings of the state.

Situating Greenberg with Skocpol

If Greenberg does not identify himself with the Marxist tradition, where does he place himself? He draws much of his inspiration from Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, particularly the importance of labor repressive agriculture as the impetus behind racial orders. Not surprisingly then many of his formulations, particularly the incorporation of the state, are strikingly

reminiscent of Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions*. It is interesting to compare these two books written independently of one another. Both are a pleasure to read, forcefully argued and supported with impressive scholarship. The one looks at the factors precipitating social revolutions as well as Old Regime legacies while the other examines the factors maintaining and undermining racial orders. Both turn to particular classes and the state as explanatory variables. I shall try and draw out the similarities and differences in methodology below, and in the conclusion examine the applicability of Skocpol's framework to the prospects and consequences of a South African revolution.

Greenberg makes four major contributions. First, he unveils the interests of particular "classes"—farmers, businessmen and white workers—in a racial order. He examines conflicts within each group over how their material interests may best be realized within a racially divided society. We note immediately that this concentration on the dominant racial group recalls Skocpol's focus on the resistance of landed upper classes to state reforms as precipitating Old Regime crises in France, Russia and China. In a similar but much less precise and convincing vein Greenberg talks of an emerging "crisis of hegemony" within the dominant racial group. For the most part, however, he claims that we can understand the changing forms of racial order by reference to the interests and capacities of white class actors. In the exploration of the interests of these class actors Greenberg presents a great deal of new material on the contemporary period gathered from government documents, reports of interest group associations and from interviews he conducted during a year's research in South Africa.

The second contribution stems from the way Greenberg cuts through a messy literature on the relationship between racism and capitalism. Rather than adopting the position of modernization theory that capitalism necessarily undermines particularistic attachments such as race, or the Marxist position that race is necessarily displaced by class as the fundamental basis for struggle and capitalist development, or the view of Blumer that capitalism can successfully adapt to a racial order, Greenberg argues for a changing relationship between racial frameworks and capitalist development. In the initial period of capitalist expansion the racial order is intensified in accordance with the interests of various dominant groups whereas in the second period those same groups begin to lose their material interests in a racial order. Instead the state itself develops interests in racism.

Here we see an interesting convergence with Skocpol whose point of departure is that the state must always be viewed as an organization with interests of its own. The role of the state in history cannot be

Thus, farmers can either "rid themselves of the peasantry" as they did in England through the enclosure movement or can "plunder the peasantry" as they did in Germany and many other countries by intensifying its exploitation as capitalism developed.

The racial orders provide a coincidence of interests that enhances the attraction and viability of the German example. Commercial farmers in a racial order, consequently, may more readily opt for the German route to capitalist agriculture: labor-repressive policies are allowed, indeed encouraged, to run a course frequently constrained in other times and places (Greenberg, 1980, p. 65).

Businessmen face a more complex set of options. They can either exploit the pre-existing racial order, oppose it or accommodate to it. Mining capital readily exploited the racial order to develop what Greenberg calls a labor repressive system based on the compound and enforced migrant labor. Manufacturing and commercial capital were more likely to simply accommodate to the racial order and on some occasions oppose its extension. They did not have the resources to organize the recruitment and repressive control over labor possessed by the mines. They were as interested in a more stable Black force that could enter the ranks of the skilled worker as in cheap unskilled Black labor. And unlike the mines, manufacturing industries had an interest in boosting domestic demand for their produce through increasing Black incomes.

Finally, the white working class faces the option of developing open or exclusive unions. Artisans were able to extend their monopoly of skill and therefore had little interest in state protection. Indeed the craft unions opposed state regulation as a threat to their power. Industrial unions, on the other hand, had the option of seeking an alliance with Black workers and pursuing broad class interests through multiracial unions, or seeking the support of the state in developing discriminatory unions to protect white privileges. Class actors adopt a particular strategy in the light of the support they are likely to receive from the environment. In this instance the state encouraged the growth of exclusive unionism with protective legislation and a "civilized labor policy."

Greenberg has a distinctive model of class. It is constituted as a purposive autonomous organization which pursues a pre-given goal in an environment from which it draws off resources. Classes are not defined in relation to one another but as actors who maximize their interests in different way according to the environment. The South African political context fosters the adoption of a labor repressive agriculture, a despotic politics of production, cheap labor power through a system of migrant labor, exclusive unionism, and so on. But, what

Greenberg's organizational model gains as a descriptive device it loses as an explanatory tool.

First, it is in the nature of the paradigm of organizational analysis that the environment be taken as given. To be sure there are suggestions that class actors do shape the environment but it does not become the object of analysis as such. Its developmental logic is inevitably left unexamined. We have no sense of the dynamics of the capitalist system or capitalist social formation of South Africa, except as the cumulative and disjointed impact of three class actors—farmers, businessmen and white workers. Thus, Greenberg views crises, such as Sharpeville in 1960 and Soweto in 1976, as opportunities or signals for class actors to shift their strategy. There is no explanation of the development of the crises themselves.

Nor is this surprising since Greenberg's is a self-consciously top down view of South Africa. He does not explicitly deal with the interests of the various African classes. His organization-environment paradigm permits him to omit the examination of subordinate classes. That is, because class actors are each seen in relation to the environment as a whole it is possible to avoid dealing explicitly with relations of classes to one another. The framework therefore repudiates the notion that classes are social relations defined through struggles. The class structure is not the object of analysis and we have therefore little sense of the motors of change. Because there is no attempt to attach any systemic logic to the development of South Africa changes in the mode of domination by farmers or businessmen are described but not explained. Thus, Greenberg describes the shifts from systems of squatting to forms of labor tenancy to systems of wage labor but this development in agricultural labor is not explained. It is not surprising, therefore, that Greenberg should be so dismissive of Morris's (1976) analysis of South African agriculture which attempts to develop an explanation of these shifts in modes of exploitation in terms of the struggles between African peasants and white farmers.

By focusing on each of the three class actors in turn Greenberg obfuscates the important distinction between the interests of the individual capitalist or fraction of the capitalist class on the one hand and the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, that is collective capital on the other. For example, it may be in the interests of a particular capitalist (farmer or businessman) to have access to cheap migrant labor while at the same time escalating costs of reproducing the *system* of migrant labor may undermine the interests of collective capital. Through what mechanisms is it possible to reconcile the economic interests of fractions of the capitalist class with the political interests of the entire class? It is through the self-organization of the dominant classes into a power bloc led by a hegemonic fraction that

reduced to class forces. Greenberg only posits the state as an autonomous or relatively autonomous actor in his conclusion. Until that point it appeared very much as an instrument of class actors. Be that as it may, Greenberg's third contribution is undoubtedly the recognition of the central role of the state in facilitating, reproducing and shaping the development of the racial order. The influence of class forces is mediated through the state. There are no accounts that attempt to systematically delineate the role of the state in capitalist development in South Africa let alone make comparisons with Alabama, Northern Ireland and Israel.

So the fourth contribution is the self-conscious attempt to get away from the prevailing view that these societies are somehow unique and therefore require a distinctive theoretical framework for their analysis. Greenberg undertakes what Skocpol calls "comparative history" in which each society is used to *illustrate some common pattern* of development, in this case the intensification and relaxation of its racial order. The analyses of the different countries are independent of each other; they shed no light on one another. Skocpol adopts a very different strategy—"comparative historical analysis"—in which she makes use of both similarities and differences in order to "develop, test, and refine causal, explanatory hypotheses about events or structures integral to macro-units such as nation-states" (p. 36).

Skocpol's methodological wizardry is impressive. By comparing "successful" revolutions (France, Russia and China) both among themselves and with "failed" revolutions (Germany, England, and Japan), she tries to establish the necessary ingredients for social revolutions. But her multivariate analysis of historical episodes suffers from the same drawbacks as the more common statistical models as applied to quantitative data, namely their suppression of causal *processes* in favor of causal *factors*. To be sure she makes the compelling arguments that successful revolutions occur when a peasant rebellion is preceded by a disintegration of state power brought about by a rift between the landed classes and the state in the context of international war, and that revolutions do not occur where one or other of these factors are absent. But in so doing she sidesteps the very difficult problems of understanding the formation of interests and capacities not only of various class actors but also of the state apparatuses. Just how difficult it is to elaborate these causal processes, presupposed and concealed in her regression analysis, is made patently clear in attempts at historical analysis of a single country. Ironically, because he does not engage in Skocpol's methodological wizardry Greenberg has to confront the problem of interest formation and interest realization directly. His approach is novel: to each "class actor" Greenberg imputes a set of "general" interests which are realized in different ways in different

societies. Thus, faced with racial orders class actors adopt distinctive strategies to realize their interests.

Each of Greenberg's contributions lays the foundation for further exploration. Thus in the following pages I will, first, examine the concept of "interest" and the formation of interests as it applies to classes. I will draw attention to the importance of looking at class in relational terms, in particular the importance of class alliances and class struggle. The omission of Black classes as a focus of analysis makes it impossible for Greenberg to unravel the forces behind South Africa's history and future. Second, building on Greenberg's conception of the changing class basis behind the racial order I will pose questions about the significance of changing relations between race and class, and among different forms of racism. Rather than looking upon the racial order as first intensifying and then relaxing I will delineate a succession of qualitatively different racial orders. Third, I will reexamine Greenberg's understanding of the relationship of classes to the state, the notion of the development of state interests and stress the importance of decomposing the state itself. Fourth, once having restored South Africa to a species of capitalism and drawn attention to similarities with other societies it then becomes necessary to reestablish its specificity. I will argue that the four racial orders Greenberg has chosen to examine are in fact so different that any development pattern they share must be either very general or very vague. A more useful comparison would be between South Africa and a non-racial order such as Brazil, which is situated in a similar position in the world economic system. In this way we can more easily highlight what is distinctive to capitalist development in racial orders. Finally, I will examine how Greenberg's conception of South African history shapes his vision of the future. Here I will suggest one has to go beyond a crisis of hegemony and the emergence of a racial state to include factors central to Skocpol's prescription for social revolution. But to refurbish and historicize Skocpol's model so that it can grapple with revolutions in the contemporary era it may be necessary to return to Marxism.

Classes, Class Struggle and the Formation of Interests

Greenberg adopts a novel approach to the understanding of class interests in racism. He divides the book into three major parts, devoting each to a single class actor (farmers, businessmen and workers). Each part begins by examining and establishing the "general" interest of the particular "class." In subsequent chapters he explores how these imputed interests are pursued in different environments, that is how class actors make use of or even oppose racial orders in the pursuit of their goals. The particular racial order determines which of a range of class strategies a given class actor will adopt.

constitutes its interests as the interests of all fractions? Greenberg's fragmented treatment of classes makes it impossible to consider this question. If, on the other hand, it is the state that represents the interests of collective capital, how does this happen? A similar analysis has to be applied to the subordinate classes in order to understand the supremacy of fractional interests over collective interests. How significant is the role of the state as compared to the structure of the economy in fractionalizing the working class? This, of course, necessarily involves an examination of Black as well as white workers.

This brings me to my final point: the question of the formation of interests. For Greenberg interests are defined in the economic arena and pursued through the associations, interest groups, etc. who act in the political arena to shape state policy. The question of imputing interests is taken as unproblematical. Greenberg precludes the possibility that interests are shaped and organized in the political arena as well as in the material world of production through ideological processes. The very notion of class as a collectivity with common interests is taken for granted. But is it possible to understand this process of class formation without also examining struggles between classes? What determines which segments of the dominant class manage to gain a presence in the political arena? Under what circumstances does a class segment, such as mining capital, become a political actor? By dealing with actors defined separately at the level of the economic there is no room for understanding the political processes through which coalitions, alliances, etc. are formed in the political arena. Finally, and most obviously, class interests are shaped in opposition to other classes, opposition encountered in the political arena as well as the economic arena, opposition that acts as a force of constraint as well as a pressure group organized within institutional channels. Again it is impossible to exclude Black classes and the way their interests are shaped in struggles, alliances, etc. All these questions become critical if we want to unravel the class forces behind racism. But we must also decide what we mean by racism.

Racial Domination and the Development of Capitalism

Greenberg summarizes the essential thesis of his book as follows:

In its early stages, capitalist development brings an elaboration of racial disabilities and a growth of the state racial apparatus, in effect, a period of intensification. . . . Capitalist development peels away the class character of the racial order but does not immediately or necessarily undermine it. . . . But in the absence of clearly articulated class interests in the dominant section, the racial order and the racial state tend toward an amorphous racism, "mere dominance" in the face of the dominant class actors' diminishing interest in

the racial framework and the subordinate population's increasing resistance to it. (Greenberg, 1980, pp. 26–28).

In the period of "intensification" the racial order receives a major impetus from a "labor repressive" agriculture which utilizes and pressures the state to bottle up Black labor in the rural areas. Farmers subsequently shift their mode of exploitation from a semi-feudal system of squatting, to forms of labor tenancy and finally to wage labor. In most areas the 1970s saw the mechanization of agriculture and corresponding pressures to stabilize Black labor in the rural areas. Farmers are no longer the fervent advocates of apartheid that they used to be.

Labor-repressive agriculture has not been dismantled: pass laws and labor bureaus still figure prominently in the lives of African laborers and white farmers alike: European farmers have not yet submitted themselves to an unfettered labor market. But the white farmer no longer requires and, more important, no longer demands that the traditional labor controls be refined and the enforcement mechanisms expanded. Indeed, with few complaints of "labor shortages" and growing demands of "economic farming," the SAAU [South African Agricultural Union] has begun to yield on the traditional concerns of the white farming community: the masters and servants laws fell with hardly a whimper; the pass laws and labor bureaus, the system of labor controls, are diminishing concerns for white farmers and the SAAU. (Greenberg, 1980, p. 105).

Similar changes occur in the industrial sector. Manufacturing capital has always supported the stabilization of Blacks and been prepared to dispense with influx control and statutory color bars. But until the 1920s at least, manufacturing capital was much weaker than mining capital. The combination of low and uncertain profits, wage costs as a high proportion of total costs and white workers organized into a powerful union led the mining companies to mobilize the racial order to guarantee cheap and productive Black labor. Competing with agriculture for labor from the African reserves mining capital was the main force behind the system of migrant labor, instigating the early pass laws, establishing powerful recruitment organizations and introducing the compound as a form of coercive labor control. With the development of capitalism, however, manufacturing capital became increasingly powerful and thus increasing the pressure to dismantle or relax part of the racial apparatus. In recent years even mining capital, prompted by soaring profits, has been calling for the softening of certain apartheid laws and the newer mines are thinking in terms of a more stabilized Black labor force as the industry becomes more capital intensive and as African wages rise.

The third force behind the racial order has been the white working class. During the first two decades of this century there was an influx

into the towns of Afrikaners dispossessed of their land, or unable to eke out an existence as squatters. Initially poor whites found themselves in competition for jobs with Blacks but in the 1920s the government adopted a "civilized labor policy" which effectively gave whites a monopoly of unskilled jobs in such industries as railways, harbors and certain government services such as post. But by the 1970s this white unskilled working class had shrunk and largely moved into positions which no longer required a system of job reservation as protection from Blacks. And so Greenberg claims that whereas in the period of intensification various white classes all had an interest in expanding the racial order, in the 1970s those same classes became increasingly indifferent to the reproduction of that order.

So why does the racial order persist? In keeping with his framework Greenberg argues that the racial order once established carries with it a momentum of its own. It becomes relatively autonomous from the classes that instigated it. More precisely, as the state becomes increasingly involved in the regulation and expansion of the system of apartheid so it develops an interest of its own in the reproduction of the racial order. In other words, a new "actor" emerges in Greenberg's scheme to sustain the racial order. We shall deal with this thesis in the next section. Here I want to pursue an alternative explanation in order to point out certain inadequacies in Greenberg's theorization of the concept of "racial order."

Convergence of Race and Class?

Insofar as class and race have begun to merge in South Africa, as some Marxist commentators have claimed, so it could be argued that the reproduction of class relations is simultaneously the reproduction of race relations. That is, the preservation of the capitalist order is a necessary and sufficient condition for the preservation of the racial order. Thus, Greenberg's three classes can afford to express a diminished interest in the racial order while at the same time upholding that order through the support of the extended reproduction of capitalism. Indeed, a convincing case might be made that these shifts in the relationship between class and color account for the recent recomposition of the dominant ideology—the crisis of the ideology of separate development and the rediscovery of *laissez faire*.

The argument contains but a partial truth. Confining one's attention to the two fundamental classes—capitalists with their high level managerial agents and the working class—there has been a movement towards racial homogenization as unskilled whites have diminished in importance. At the same time, however, intermediary classes holding, what Wright calls "contradictory class locations"—technical and supervisory workers and semi-autonomous employees—and also

the true petty bourgeoisie have become racially more heterogeneous with the rise of the Black teachers, nurses, police, that is state functionaries, as well as supervisors within industry. These intermediary groups are directly or indirectly involved in the containment and/or exploitation of the Black working class. Furthermore they are likely to develop an interest in the expansion of South African capital and the strengthening of the South African state (Wolpe, 1978).

How then is it possible to reproduce *class* divisions within each of the racial groups while at the same time enforcing *racial* divisions within these intermediary class locations? Certainly the ideology of apartheid which makes no reference to class distinctions is not well suited for such a role. At this point I want to draw attention to one implication. The changing racial composition of the class structure suggests not so much a declining interest among the three class actors in the racial order per se. Instead it suggests an interest in a *new* racial order in which a growing Black "middle class" is allowed to develop as a buffer between the two fundamental and racially homogeneous classes. This reflects a shift from separate development which divides up Blacks into different "nations"—the homeland policy—to the creation of a relatively privileged stratum of Blacks in the urban areas, as well as in the Bantustans. Such recommendations to establish a division between a stabilized Black urban population and a migrant labor force rooted in the overpopulated and undernourished homelands, are formulated explicitly by the Wiehahn and Rickert Commissions of 1979. Conflicts between the Zulu migrant workers housed in hostels and the students of Soweto during the massive protests of 1976 already pointed to a growing schism between these two segments of the Black population.

I draw attention to these changes in class stratification within racial groups to suggest that what Greenberg considers a declining interest in "the racial order" is but a declining interest in a particular, old racial order and the emergence of a new racial order. However, it is no accident that Greenberg views changes in South Africa in this way since his framework does not permit him to understand variations in a racial order except in terms of "intensification" or "relaxation." He cannot distinguish among different racial orders because he defines them tautologically in terms of racial domination.

My primary research settings are racial orders, societies where racial differences are formalized and socially pervasive. Other identities and forms of differentiation, no matter how important to the development and characterization of the society, must contend with a powerful social schism: to one side, a dominant section with disproportionate control over economic resources, a presumptive privilege in social relations, and a virtual monopoly on access to the state, to the other side, a subordinate section with constrained economic resources and with little standing in social or political relations (Greenberg, 1980, pp. 29–30).

Such a definition which takes race as given inclines Greenberg towards an analysis of the rise and fall of class bases behind a racial order rather than attempt to theorize the succession of different racial orders. To refer to a period as one of "intensification" or "relaxation" merely labels what in fact has to be explained. What is it about this period of "intensification" that leads his three class actors to exhibit a convergent interest in a racial order?

Succession of Racial Orders


To make the point clearer I will briefly argue the thesis that the first racial order emerged in response to the problem of primitive accumulation, the problem of partially severing the African peasantry from its pre-capitalist moorings, that is the problem of generating and reproducing a supply of migrant labor which was simultaneously dependent on capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. Such a pattern of proletarianization would explain the convergence of interests among Greenberg's three class actors—farmers, businessmen and white workers. During the second period capitalism establishes itself in industry and agriculture. Pre-capitalist modes of production all but disappear, leaving behind geographically isolated and poverty stricken labor reservoirs. The new racial order reflects the declining salience of the generation of labor supplies and the domination of the reproduction of labor power by the requirements of production. The focus shifts from the dissolution of the peasantry to the extraction of surplus value.

Simply put, we must therefore distinguish between two *arenas* of racial domination, viz. the labor process and the reproduction of labor power. We must also distinguish between two *modes* of racial domination, viz. barriers to *mobility* (geographical and social) and particular *relations* of exploitation and domination. Let us examine the labor process first. Here we observe distinctive mechanisms for reproducing exercises relatively undisputed power over Black laborers. This form of domination I call colonial despotism. It rests on the absence of institutionalized forms of resistance to managerial coercion or threat of coercion. As we shall see below colonial despotism is largely based on the employer's power to affect the lives of workers outside the workplace. It also depends on a discriminatory internal labor market, that is a set of mobility patterns which uphold the principle of the color bar, according to which Black workers never exercise any authority over white workers. This is the second dimension of racial domination in the labor process.

Colonial despotism also rests on forms of racial domination in the reproduction of labor power. It is not simply that, when fired, Black workers have no recourse to grievance machinery but that the single

most important way of becoming a permanent resident in town is to maintain the same employment for ten years. Naturally, such legislation of urban residence and influx control places extensive power in the hands of management, the more so the longer an employee is with a particular employer until the ten year period is up. While the apparatus of apartheid entrenches colonial despotism through linking livelihood outside work to performance at work in a multiplicity of ways, at the same time the specific forms of reproduction of labor power, whether rooted in the system of migrant labor or the emerging multiple earner family of the more permanent labor force, are also organized to guarantee its cheapness. The system of compounds or hostels for the single migrants; the segregated townships; the multiplication of residence restrictions; the influx controls which regulate the flow of labor between the urban areas and the "homelands"; the system of labor bureaus which directs labor to employers in industry or agriculture; the pass laws which limit the amount of time Blacks can remain in "white areas," including all the major towns, without employment—all these features conspire to produce a weak and above all low wage labor force. As in the labor process the barriers to *mobility* are intimately interwoven with the specific *relations* of domination in the reproduction of labor power.

MODES AND ARENAS OF RACIAL DOMINATION



What we have done is to break down "racism" into four components—two types of domination within each of two arenas—so as to uncover some of the relations, namely the economic relations it both expresses and conceals. When Greenberg claims there to be a declining interest in the racial order he does not make analytical distinctions among the

elements of that order. Whereas his three classes may exhibit less of an interest in the panoply of laws which regulate the reproduction of Black labor power, at the same time they show few signs of relinquishing racial domination at the point of production. (See Moodie, [1980] for an account of the patterns of domination in a South African gold mine.) Indeed Greenberg says as much himself (pp. 195–201) but he fails to examine the interconnection between the particular forms of control outside work, in the towns and reserves, and the colonial despotism exercised within the capitalish enterprise. To be sure the rising organic composition of capital leads agricultural and industrial capital to become increasingly interested in a more stable Black labor force but so organized as to uphold racial domination at the point of production.

These remarks are somewhat speculative. I introduce them to highlight the importance of breaking down the racial order into its constituent components, of examining the interdependence among the components, and finally of analyzing the way they are rearticulated with one another as capitalism develops. In short, instead of arguing for the rise and fall of class interests in a racial order, I am suggesting that capitalist development involves the transformation of the racial order as well as the transformation of class structure and class interests. At each point the role of the state is critical.

The State

Greenberg's third major contribution is to award a central place to the role of the state in orchestrating the racial order. Indeed, the state becomes the most critical part of the "environment" in the attempts by class actors to realize their interests. However, Greenberg has two very different conceptions of the relationship between class actor and the state. The first conception springs from his definition of a racial order as one in which the dominant section has "a virtual monopoly on access to the state." Here the state is viewed as the instrument of particular classes. Thus, during the period of "intensification" when racism is deepened and extended the state is "willing" and "able" (p. 87) to construct labor repressive policies for farmers, and for mine owners as well as protective legislation for white workers. But this begs the question: under what conditions is the state "willing" or "able" to act in the interests of a given class? Is it enough to refer to formal access to the state? Obviously not. Precisely because a "subordinate section" is excluded from the formal political processes it becomes that much more threatening and therefore a predominant force in shaping state policies. The bloated repressive apparatus of the South African state is testimony to the strength of the Black popula-

tion. In other words we cannot look upon the state as simply the instrument of particular classes but have to examine the state as the context of class struggle and class alliances—an analysis systematically precluded by Greenberg.

Greenberg recognizes problems with this instrumental perspective on the state but only at the empirical level. Thus, he argues in the last chapter for a second conception of the state. When the interests of the three white class actors dictate a declining commitment to the racial order the state conveniently loses its instrumental quality. All of a sudden it becomes autonomous and develops its own interests in the reproduction of the racial order.

There is, nonetheless, good reason to believe that the state apparatus represents more than this particular convergence of class interests. In the first place, such bureaucratic machinery, independent of the needs of class actors and the requirements of the racial order, develops its own momentum and areas of autonomous action. . . . Second, and more important, state functionaries and a succession of governments rose above instrumental interests to help organize the dominance of commercial farmers and maintain the class alignments that underlay racial domination in its modern form. In reconciling what were often bitter and regular conflicts between class actors, the racial state emerged not just as a "political organizer of hegemony" or as a "condensation of a balance of forces," as Poulantzas suggests, but as an increasingly autonomous agency representing the interests of the dominant section as a whole (Greenberg, 1980, pp. 389–90).

From being a part of the environment manipulated by class actors it becomes an actor itself pursuing its goal in an environment of class actors. From being an object wielded by various class actors it becomes a subject opposing the economic interest of those same actors.

There are some problems with this formulation. First, the South African economy is still predicated on racial domination both in the labor process and in the reproduction of labor power. As I argued earlier individual capitalists therefore continue to have an interest in particular forms of racial subordination although they may no longer fight to extend them. But even if Greenberg were correct that certain fractions of capital no longer defend the racial order as in their economic interests, nevertheless their political interests in the preservation of South African capitalism as a whole reside with the reproduction of a racial order. That is, certain fractions of capital might have to make economic sacrifices to the interest of collective capital, to the interest of maintaining a capitalist South Africa. Here again we come up against the problem of the definition, formation and articulation of interests—a problem Greenberg tends to sweep under the table.

Greenberg's formulation raises a second question: how is it that the state is an instrument in one period and autonomous in the next,

an object in the first and a subject in the second? He claims that once established the apparatuses of repression and administration develop vested interests in their own expansion and thus a vested interest in the racial order. But why cannot these same apparatuses shift their task to the expansion of education or welfare facilities for Blacks? Do all apparatuses have an interest in the expanded reproduction of racism? And why didn't the state have interests of its own in the first period of "intensification"? How is it that the state manages to "rise above" the interests of class actors in the second period but not the first? The flourish of state autonomy in the last chapter in the face of a supposed decline in the class basis of racism is a reflection of the crisis of Greenberg's theoretical framework as much as a crisis of South Africa's racial framework.

Greenberg has to demonstrate historically why the state might be an instrument in one period and autonomous in the second. To be consistent with his own framework, and he hints at this at one point, he might argue that during the first period businessmen, farmers and white workers were both powerful and in accord so that they successfully subordinated the state to their collective will whereas during the second period divisions within the dominant classes and between the dominant classes and the subordinate classes intensify so as to permit and indeed make necessary greater state autonomy. But such an argument would make little historical sense. First, as has been documented by both Marxists and non-Marxists, mining capital was absorbed in bitter struggles with agriculture and manufacturing capital over fiscal and labor policies of the state throughout the period of "intensification." Mining capital geared to export markets fought for cheap labor policies and low cost imports whereas domestic agriculture and manufacturing aimed to develop through import substitution, relying on protective legislation and the expansion of the internal market if necessary through boosting Black incomes. Agriculture and manufacturing developed at the expense of super-profits of the gold mining industry. It is only recently that these struggles have abated with the interweaving of national, international and state capital. Equally struggles between white labor and mining capital over the use of cheap Black labor were at their most bitter in the first period. In other words, if state autonomy is to be regarded as the product of an equilibrium of class forces then we would expect the very opposite of Greenberg's claim: autonomy in the first period and instrumentality in the second. Conceivably such a "class balance" argument could be rescued by restoring struggles of the various Black classes, explicitly excluded from Greenberg's framework.

But the problem runs deeper than giving a more complete account of class struggles. As I have tried to suggest at other points, concealed

beneath the lacunae in his historical analysis lie serious theoretical shortcomings. Like so many Marxist and non-Marxist theories of the state, Greenberg never directly deals with the state *per se* but infers attributes of the state through an account of its *effects*. This is a problem he shared with those who define the state in terms of its "functions"—legitimation and accumulation, administrative reconfiguration, preservation of the cohesion of the entire social formation, mediation among competing interest groups, etc. There is no theory of how the state comes to perform those functions, produce those effects. We have no sense of the "production of politics," the organization of the state as an inter-related set of apparatuses with "labor processes" of their own which (re)produce relations rather than commodities.

Instead the state is viewed either as an instrument of one or more dominant classes or as an "autonomous" organization with a logic of its own. In both perspectives the state is constituted as a monolith and the important struggles take place outside its institutional boundaries. Within these schema those sensitive to the problems of explaining how it is that the state does what it does either suggests that the "ruling class" possesses an enlightened class consciousness which it impresses on state managers, or contrariwise state managers, whose own interests can be realized only after the realization of the interests of capitalists, represent and enforce the needs of collective capital. Skocpol takes this position of Block (1977) and Lindblom (1977) even further in her insistence on an autonomy of the state based on state-building itself as the *raison d'être* of state managers. Within the newly formed Soviet state the struggle between Stalin and the Left Opposition is mentioned only in passing as if its outcome were predetermined by the conjuncture of international forces and the legacy of revolutionary upheaval.

In all these approaches to the state—instrumental, relative autonomy and organizational autonomy—what happens has to happen. There is no attempt to approach the indeterminacy of state interventions by recognizing that the state, too, is an arena of consequential struggle—both between apparatuses and within apparatuses. It follows, then, that autonomy and instrumentality are not some pregiven conditions of "the state" but the product of struggles within the state. Furthermore, the mode through which classes and class fractions make their presence felt in the state arena is itself shaped by the state and becomes the object of struggle.

To return to Greenberg: he reduces the distinctiveness of the South African state to the effects it produces, not the process of production of those effects. When those effects do not accord with the interests of his three class actors then he postulates the state as an autonomous actor

with its own interests. From being an object the state becomes a subject, the one perspective is a mere inversion of the other. We must escape the subject-object conceptualization and begin to develop a notion of the state as a specific state of relations, as an articulated system of apparatuses and as an arena of struggles. As Poulantzas (1978) has suggested the counterpart to struggles for state power inside as well as outside the state is the materialization of power in apparatuses outside as well as inside the state. Moreover the relationship between the two sets of struggles is shaped by the relations among the corresponding sets of apparatuses. From the production of politics we must return to the politics of production (Burawoy, 1981b).

The Specificity of South Africa

The virtue of Greenberg's comparative analysis, which includes partial studies of Alabama, Northern Ireland and Israel, lies in the refutation of South Africa as a deviant case. In each country, Greenberg claims, the rise and fall of class interests in the racial order is compensated by a growing state interest in the racial order. Naturally, the criticisms I earlier levelled at the analysis of South Africa—the conception of class, of class interests, of the racial order and of the state—apply equally to the other case studies. Just as his analysis of South Africa fails to delineate the succession different racial orders (they are merely more or less intense) so his comparisons stress similarities instead of distinguishing among the racial orders. And it is precisely here that a certain theoretical looseness necessarily enters. Despite their "plural" character South Africa, Alabama, Israel and Northern Ireland are fundamentally different societies at various stages of economic and political development, with varying social structures and linked into the world system in diverse ways. What they share must be so general as to be almost tautologous. Therefore, insofar as Greenberg insists on a single development scheme which embraces all four societies so it must necessarily be vague and ill-defined—hence such descriptive labelling of periods ("intensification" versus "relaxation"), opposing conceptions of state intervention ("instrumental" versus "autonomous"), etc.

Given his objective of exploring the class forces behind racial orders, it is surprising that Greenberg makes no attempt to show how different balances of class forces lead to different racial orders. Such an agenda is hinted at only in the conclusion to the present work—a plan for the next book rather than a program of this one.

Racial domination, it should also be apparent from the reconstruction, is essentially a class phenomenon. By understanding the developing class relations in these settings, we can understand much of the specificity and the

dynamic in developing race relations. Racial domination is not an amorphous, all encompassing relationship between groups distinguished by physical characteristics but, for the most part, a *series of specific class relations that vary by place and over time and that change as a consequence of changing material conditions*. South African race relations, for example, can be characterized generally by the subordination of the African majority and the dominance of the Europeans or, alternatively, by a range of class specific policies, such as mining compounds, land alienation, native reserves, pass laws, labor bureaus, influx control, migrant labor and job reservations. Each should be understood in the context of the class actors and alignments that urged it on the state. Even the evolution of elaborate ideological constructions, like apartheid, should be considered in light of the class actors who demanded the destruction of African peasant agriculture, control over African proletarianization, and protection for European workers (Greenberg, 1980, p. 406, italics added).

To be sure this is a major advance on his earlier formulations of racial domination (pp. 103, and 105 of this paper) but so long as he has no theory of capitalism and its dynamics then he can only catalogue "the series of specific class relations that vary by place and over time and that change as a consequence of material conditions." Whereas Greenberg is content to identify the diverse class relations underlying the racial order, Marxists such as Wolpe, Legassick and Davies, insist on moving a step further by embedding their analysis in a *theory* of the reproduction of those relations, that is a theory of their interconnection and of their dynamics.

An alternative strategy for highlighting the significance of the racial order in the context of capitalist development would be to compare South Africa with a country, such as Brazil, similarly placed in the world economic system, at a similar level of development but without an elaborated racial order. Is apartheid one expression of a repressive regime, one mode of state corporatism which reflects the exigencies of the late dependent development? Following the scheme of Cardoso and Faletto we can begin to see broad parallels between the phases of development in South Africa and those in Latin America.

Cardoso and Faletto (1979) examine "external domination in situations of national dependency" in Latin America as "the internalization of external interests" (p. xiv).

... the system of domination reappears as an "internal" force, through the social practices of local groups and classes which try to enforce foreign interests, not precisely because they are foreign, but because they may coincide with the values and interests that these groups pretend are their own (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, p. xiv).

Thus, the social and political structures of Latin American societies are seen to be shaped by the interaction of internal and external forces. With the beginning of capital export from Britain, the construction of

infrastructure in particular railroads and the search for raw materials in the middle of the nineteenth century Latin America entered a period of "outward expansion" which lasted until the end of World War One. This was followed by a period of "transition." New social groups which had grown up alongside, auxiliary to the export sector and in large part associated with the expansion of the state, began to push for industrial expansion and diversification. After World War Two newly proletarianized sectors generated new national populist pressures from below which were translated into extensive import substitution based on an expanding domestic market. After the first easy phase of import substitution had been completed political crises signalled that further development depended on either a strategy of self-reliance and socialist revolution or increased participation by large scale foreign capital. Where the latter path was chosen international capital has in fact fostered a limited "dependent development," resting on the internationalization of the internal market and the systematic repression of subordinate classes. In this last phase national, international and state capital forge what Evans (1979) calls a "triple alliance."

A similar sequence of developmental phases can be sketched out for South Africa: an initial period in which political relations among social classes reflected the dominance of an export enclave economy largely based on gold mining. A second phase sprung from the growth of new classes, in particular the proletarianized Afrikaner farmers, who secured protected positions in state bureaucracies and corporations, and a rising manufacturing class. A third phase of Afrikaner nationalism pushes the developmental process forward with extensive import substitution, state protected industries and expanding sector of parastatal corporations. In the last twenty years, instigated by growing African resistance and triggered by Sharpeville, the South African state orchestrated closer ties between national and international capital while at the same time intensifying repression of the Black working classes and expanding consumerism among all the white classes. More recently we notice attempts, similar to those in Brazil, to begin to "incorporate" sections of the urbanized Black proletariat. One also notes the ominous growth in the political strength and presence of the South African military—militarism without a military coup.

Although this dependency model of Cardoso and Faletto is descriptive and takes for granted shifts in the metropolitan economies as well as their transmission to peripheral societies, nevertheless the parallels are striking. On the one hand they reinforce Greenberg's focus on the established semi-feudal Afrikaner landed class as central to South African development, indeed distinguishing South Africa from other African social formations. On the other hand they also suggest that location in the world economic, and indeed political, system is critical

to the understanding of the relationship between state and civil society. Furthermore, the racial order of South Africa becomes one particular system of class relations, one particular mode of internalizing external relations under conditions of dependent late development. The specification of that mode, that particular social formation can most logically proceed through comparisons with such countries as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, and not with disparate racial orders. This is not to say that race is either superficial or epiphenomenal but that it can assume central importance in diverse societies with diverse signification.

The South African Revolution in Comparative Perspective

I began by saying that *Race and State in Capitalist Development* is a landmark book. It is now clear why. We need never turn back. Greenberg has set us firmly on the path forward, to specify the class relations racism shapes, expresses and conceals, to specify the class forces behind the elements of each racial order, and to specify the role of the state in reproducing or transforming the articulation of the constituent elements of a racial order in the context of a particular world economic system. In short, Greenberg inadvertently demonstrates that there cannot be a *theory* of racial orders, only of capitalist relations.

But Greenberg points us in another direction too. If we are to grasp the future of South Africa we cannot rest content to reduce race to class, to explain race away as an expression of underlying economic relations. That expression has a reality of its own, it is a powerful lived experience that shapes struggles, that makes revolution in the prospect of tomorrow. Racism has a real basis not only in the relations of production but outside them in the realms of politics and ideology. We have to follow Greenberg's concluding prescription: to investigate the political as such. This is precisely Theda Skocpol's point of departure. What relevance, then, is her analysis of the great revolutions of France, Russia and China to social revolutions in the contemporary world, in particular South Africa?

Limits are thus placed on the generalizability of the specific causal patterns identified for France, Russia and China because other social revolutions have occurred (most more recently) in countries with significantly different political histories located in more dependent international positions. Additional, still more fundamental limits on the generalizability of the classic social-revolutionary patterns can be traced to historical transformations, relevant on an international scale, in the forms and bases of state power (Skocpol, 1979, p. 289).

Just as Greenberg's conclusion hastily revises his theory of the class basis of *racial orders* to fit the contemporary reality, so Skocpol pushes aside much of her careful analysis of failed and successful *social revolutions* in order to account for "modern" revolutions. All we are left with is a methodological prescription: "... a focus on the nexes of state/state, state/economy, and state/class relationships remains useful for deciphering the logic of social-revolutionary causes and outcomes, from France in the 1790s to Vietnam, Angola, and Ethiopia in the 1970s" (Skocpol, 1979, p. 292). Instead of *theorizing* the distinctiveness of modern revolutions she is prepared to dislocate past and present by *labelling* the one as the era of classical revolutions and the other the era of modern revolutions. She jettisons her comparative historical analysis too easily. The problem is akin to Greenberg's unwillingness to *theorize* the changing role of the state from object of manipulation to autonomous subject—the anomalies of the present are treated as *deviations* from the past.

How can we bridge Skocpol's analysis of classical revolutions to the contemporary period? How might she have historicized her treatment so as to make it relevant to the present, and in particular South Africa? Here she could have drawn on the wealth of comparative historical analysis of revolutions within Marxism—the same Marxism she castigates for its "voluntarism," "economic reductionism" and for ignoring international relations. But perhaps we have to commit one or another of these sins in order to elucidate the specificity of the "modern revolution?"

It is surprising, for example, that Skocpol never confronts such an experienced executor of comparative historical analysis as Leon Trotsky. As early as 1906, in his *Results and Prospects*, Trotsky highlights the similarities and differences between the French and "failed" German revolutions to anticipate, with uncanny accuracy, the unfolding of the Russian revolution. His account of 1917, elaborated in *The History of the Russian Revolution*, is almost identical to Skocpol's: the strains of World War I, the weakness of the landed classes, subordination to foreign capital, the parasitic nature of the Czarist state stifling the very development which was its life-blood, and agrarian backwardness all combined with peasant war to precipitate the revolution. Furthermore, Trotsky's discussion of the "Soviet Thermidor" in *The Revolution Betrayed* bears a close resemblance to Skocpol's comparative historical analysis of post-revolutionary periods. Both stress the problem of state building and economic development in a backward country surrounded by hostile nations and a resistant peasantry, although Trotsky's discussion of struggles permits a certain indeterminacy of outcome precluded by Skocpol's "structural" approach.

Skocpol parts company with Trotsky in her search for the *common* ingredients of all three revolutions.

Peasant revolts against landlords were a necessary ingredient in all three Revolutions, whereas successful revolts by urban workers were not. Thus, for the explanatory purposes at hand, attention to the conditions for and against peasant insurrections is far more important than a focus, however more customary, upon the urban revolts (Skocpol, 1979, p. 113).

By contrast Trotsky insists:

History does not repeat itself. However much one may compare the Russian Revolution with the Great French Revolution, the former cannot be transformed into a repetition of the later (Trotsky, 1969 [1906], p. 52).

The passing of the nineteenth century was not in vain.

In order to realise the Soviet state, there was required a drawing together and mutual penetration of two factors belonging to completely different historic species: a peasant war—that is, a movement characteristic of the dawn of bourgeois development—and a proletarian insurrection, the movement signaling its decline. That is the essence of 1917 (Trotsky, 1977 [1932], p. 72).

This is obviously not the place to discuss Trotsky's comparisons of the French, Russian and "failed" German revolutions. Suffice to say that the critical factor becomes the changing balance of class forces occasioned by the combined and uneven development of capitalism on a world scale, precisely the factor that Skocpol deliberately omits and precisely the factor that carries Trotsky easily, much *too* easily, into the twentieth century armed with a theory of revolutions drawn from and continuous with his analysis of the nineteenth century.

His views are of particular relevance to South Africa where the peasantry has been all but destroyed and the African reserves have become dumping grounds for "superfluous appendages"—labor reservoirs for the unemployed and the unemployable. They help us consider the possibility of a revolution without peasant wars. They draw attention to the specificity of the class composition of the South African nationalist revolution, viz. its overwhelmingly proletarian character, contrasting it with the earlier African liberation movements which were heavily shaped by petty bourgeois interests (including clerks, teachers, ministers, lowly civil servants, traders and sometimes peasantry). Thus, by virtue of the unique combination of an elaborate colonial political structure and an advanced capitalist economy South Africa may be the scene of the first proletarian revolution. It is difficult to contemplate such a revolution, violent and ugly as it would have to be, nevertheless it might not unleash the same extensive state bureaucracies required to stem and coopt the peasant resistance of the classical revolutions. Moreover, the greater development of the forces of production might conceivably permit a movement towards some form of proletarian democracy. Obviously the international context of the revolution would critically shape its outcome.

If Trotsky permits a loosening of Skocpol's untheorized dichotomy—classical/modern revolutions—there is a danger that the entire distinction be swallowed up in an exclusive reliance on the balance of class forces as *the* index of revolutionary processes. This would be very misleading. It ignores those two factors, so central to Skocpol's analysis, viz. the form of state and international forces. Yet as we have seen she never theorizes the distinctiveness of these factors in the modern era. For all her insistence on treating the state as an organization she has no theory of the capitalist state that would enable her to build a bridge from the past to the present. Here she might have drawn on the work of Antonio Gramsci but only at the expense of her *bête noire*—voluntarism.

Skocpol would undoubtedly agree with Gramsci's assessment of Trotsky as "theorist of frontal attack in a period in which it only leads to defeats" (1971, p. 238). Presumably, she would endorse Gramsci's distinction between classical and modern revolutions. Where they would differ is over the characterization of that distinction. She would also approve of Gramsci's methodology—a comparative historical analysis at least as sophisticated as her own—which draws out the similarities and differences between revolutions in "East" and "West" and within the West between the successful French revolution and the failed revolutions of Germany and particularly Italy. But they would differ over objectives. The purpose of Gramsci's complex historical analysis was to elucidate the precise character of the "modern revolution" and the transition to socialism in advanced capitalist societies and *not* simply the factors shared by the classical revolutions.

For Gramsci the 1870s mark the end of a period in which the state can be confronted directly through "war of movement." New structures of civil society emerge to surround the state, as trenches around a fortress, making it less vulnerable to frontal assault. Revolutionary strategy has to shift from war of movement to war of position.

Political concept of the so-called "Permanent Revolution," which emerged before 1848 as a scientifically evolved expression of the Jacobin experience from 1789 to Thermidor. The formula belongs to an historical period in which the great mass of political parties and the great economic trade unions did not exist, and society was still, so to speak, in a state of fluidity from many points of view: greater backwardness of the countryside, and almost complete monopoly of political and State power by a few cities or even by a single one (Paris in the case of France); a relatively rudimentary State apparatus, and greater autonomy of civil society from State activity; a specific system of military forces and of national armed services; greater autonomy of the national economies from the economic relations of the world market, etc. In the period after 1870, with the colonial expansion of Europe, all these elements change: the internal and international organisational relations of the State

become more complex and massive, and the Forty-Eightest formula of the "Permanent Revolution" is expanded and transcended in political science by the formula of "civil hegemony." The same thing happens in the art of politics as happens in military art: war of movement increasingly becomes war of position, and it can be said that a State will win a war in so far as it prepares for it minutely and technically in peacetime. The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the "trenches" and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely "partial" the element of movement which before used to be "the whole" of war, etc. [Gramsci, 1971, p. 243].

Gramsci, here and throughout the notebooks, goes beyond the notion of the state as an organization to examine its institutions and their interrelationships. His account of the classical revolutions is quite compatible with Skocpol's repudiation of consensual images of society—there indeed "the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous"—but in the modern period, in the "West," "there was a proper relation between the State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 238). In short, Skocpol's "structural" analysis is not supra-historical but has to be relativized. It is indeed specific to the era of classical revolutions.

How does all this help us understand South Africa? Which formula applies: Permanent Revolution or civil hegemony? Skocpol seems to be in no doubt:

Yet, surely, any such consensual and voluntaristic conceptions of societal order and disruption or change are quite naive. They are belied in the most obvious fashion by the prolonged survival of such blatantly repressive domestically illegitimate regimes as the South African (Skocpol, 1979, p. 16).

But this is a much too simplistic account of South Africa. Anthropological studies, novels, analyses of the history of resistance movements, of the role of the Church point out time and time again the stranglehold of the myth of white supremacy. Indeed, the Black Consciousness Movement, as reflected, for example, in the writings of Steve Biko, saw its primary task in breaking down the consent that followed from generations of degradation and demoralization on the one side and from the daily compulsion to manipulate the system of repressive laws on the other. Moreover, as I suggested earlier, significant strata of the South African Black population do have interests very much tied into the apartheid regime, particularly in the absence of an effective resistance movement.

Greenberg himself refers to a "crisis of hegemony," originating in a growing rift between the dominant white classes and the state: the

former seeking to replace "the exercise of coercive force alone" with "ethical-political hegemony in civil society." "The bourgeoisie hoped the state would forsake its racial character and emerge as an 'educator,' reflecting a seeming moral consensus and helping legitimize class relations" (Greenberg, 1980, p. 400). But what is this "traditional racial hegemony?" To what extent does it involve a "spontaneous" consent "given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12)? Or is Greenberg using hegemony very loosely here to designate any form of domination rather than the strict use of Gramsci: hegemony in civil society/domination in the state?

However, the point is clear: certain leading forces in South Africa are, belatedly, trying to catch up with history and to create from above the institutions which elsewhere were won from below. We can see this in a wide range of pseudo-concessions, from the recent constitutional reforms to the fostering of limited Black trade unions. But there are a few signs that such corporatist policies are eliciting the active cooperation of Black leaders in the production of a new racial order. Perhaps more significant is the question of whether such reforms are developing schisms within the dominant classes of South Africa or between those classes and the state. For only under such circumstances might the seemingly limitless repression of the South African military machine appear indecisive. Only under such circumstances might the "inevitability," "naturalness" of white supremacy be undermined and "common sense" liberated from the dead-weight of "tradition." Thus, it is important to distinguish between hegemony organized within the dominant classes—the constitution of the power bloc—and hegemony exercised by the power bloc through the state and civil society over the subordinate classes. The form of state autonomy can be seen as reflecting and shaping these two hegemonies and their inter-relations. Moreover, the development of an "organic crisis" turns on the relationship between the failure of hegemony in the power bloc to its failure in the wider society. It was in such terms that Gramsci was able to dissect the revolutionary ruptures in France and Russia as well as their absence in Italy.

But there can be no doubt that such organic crises are precipitated by transnational forces, all the more so for "semi-peripheral" societies. The soaring price of gold and the Lisbon Coup, both shaped by events in the West, transformed the political and economic context of the South African revolution in the 1970s. Skocpol is undoubtedly correct: revolutions are not made—they happen. But outcomes, at least in the

modern era, are shaped by the balance of class forces and the organization of consent as well as by state/state, state/economy and state/class relations.

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